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Abstract—Privacy is a concept found throughout human his-
tory and opinion polls suggest that the public value this principle.
However, while many individuals claim to care about privacy,
they are often perceived to express behaviour to the contrary.
This phenomenon is known as the Privacy Paradox and its
existence has been validated through numerous psychological,
economic and computer science studies. Several contributory
factors have been suggested including user interface design, risk
salience, social norms and default configurations. We posit that
the further proliferation of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) will
aggravate many of these factors, posing even greater risks to
individuals’ privacy. This paper explores the evolution of both
the paradox and the IoT, discusses how privacy risk might alter
over the coming years, and suggests further research required
to address a reasonable balance. We believe both technological
and socio-technical measures are necessary to ensure privacy is
protected in a world of ubiquitous technology.
Keywords—Online privacy, Privacy paradox, Internet-of-
Things, Privacy by design, Socio-technical
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy has been an important concept throughout human
history, with many great civilisations and philosophers con-
sidering the subject. The Code of Hammurabi protected the
Ancient Babylonian home against intrusion by others [1],
while Socrates distinguished between the ‘outer’ and ‘inner’
self [2]. Warren and Brandeis placed privacy in the modern
democratic consciousness, reacting to perceived excesses in
photojournalism by defining a ‘right to be let alone’ [3].
Privacy is now enshrined as a legal and human right in many
nations across the world, particularly through Article 17 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. With
privacy considered essential to both democracy [4] and natural
human development [5], it is of little surprise that many claim
to value this liberty.
Numerous opinion polls and surveys suggest that individuals
care about privacy. In 2015, the University of Pennsylvania
found that 84% of participants want to control disclosure to
marketers, with 91% disagreeing that data should be traded
for customer discounts [6]. A 2013 Pew Research Center
poll similarly found that 86% of participants reported taking
steps to remain private online, whether by cleaning cookies
or encrypting emails [7]. While these studies suggest that
individuals value their privacy, there is much evidence to the
contrary. Carrascal et al. found participants were willing to sell
their web browsing history for only e7 [8], while Beresford
and colleagues discovered that individuals neglect privacy
concerns while making purchases [9]. Researchers found that
74% of US respondents had location-based services enabled,
exchanging sensitive information for convenience [10]. This
presents the ‘Privacy Paradox’ [11], where individuals claim to
value their privacy but appear to not act accordingly. Previous
work has suggested that a number of factors, including user
interface design [12], risk salience [13] and privacy settings
[14], can exacerbate this disparity between claim and action.
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) promises to be the digital
revolution of the twenty-first century [15]. It has the potential
to connect together a vast number of ubiquitous components,
enmeshing itself within our everyday lives. It promises to offer
a wealth of opportunities for productivity and convenience
and is predicted to generate trillions of dollars for the global
economy [16]. While the revolutionary appeal of the IoT is
clear, its development is likely to be in tension with privacy.
Wearable fitness devices have already suggested the pregnancy
of their owners [17], while connected TVs can eavesdrop
on background conversations [18]. Small, ubiquitous products
enable pervasive data collection at a scale far greater than pre-
viously possible. Constrained gadgets communicate remotely
with other heterogeneous appliances, with owners having little
understanding of their novel products.
We posit that the further development of the IoT will
exacerbate the Privacy Paradox, causing a number of privacy
risks for consumers. Those factors which these new devices
aggravate, such as the salience of risk, mental models and
default settings, are precisely those which currently contribute
to this phenomenon. In this paper we look to explore how the
Internet-of-Things will fundamentally differ from conventional
computing technologies and how this will impact the Privacy
Paradox. From this, we suggest research avenues, both tech-
nological and socio-technical, which we believe will promote
a reasonable balance between privacy and functionality. We
are, to our knowledge, the first work to consider the paradox
in this novel context and hope to elucidate the privacy risks
which these new technologies bring.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section
II surveys the Privacy Paradox in detail, considering opinion
polls which suggest concern, evidence to the contrary, and
existing literature. Section III then discusses those factors
considered contributory to the paradox, including lack of user
awareness, interface design and privacy policy complexity.
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2Section IV explores the IoT before examining the significant
novelties of these products compared to conventional comput-
ing devices. Section V discusses the intersection of the topics
and the technological and socio-technical research we believe
necessary for the future. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VI and reflect on what implications the Internet-of-
Things might have for privacy.
II. THE PRIVACY PARADOX
As previously discussed, a large number of opinion polls
and surveys have shown that individuals claim to value privacy.
In 2013, Pew Research Center found that 86% of surveyed
US citizens reported taking steps to remain private online,
with actions ranging from “clearing cookies to encrypting
their email” [7]. A University of Pennsylvania poll concluded
that 84% of US participants “want to have control over what
marketers can learn about”, also finding that 91% disagree that
data collection is a fair trade for consumer discounts [6].
Research undertaken in the aftermath of the surveillance
revelations has shown privacy concerns on both sides of the
Atlantic. Researchers discovered 87% of US respondents had
heard of the scandal with 34% of those altering their behaviour
[19], while a customer concern survey found 92% reported
worrying about their privacy online [20]. Although the general
public clearly claim to care about their privacy, they are often
found to act contrary to their reports.
Carrascal and colleagues used a reverse second price auction
to analyse the values placed on personally identifiable inform-
ation (PII) [8]. They discovered participants were willing to
sell their browsing history for only e7, contrasting with the
oft-claimed importance of privacy. PII is rapidly becoming an
outdated concept, with aggregations of publicly-available data
now often of greater sensitivity than personal details. Beres-
ford et al. conducted a similar study, instructing individuals
to buy from one of two competing online stores, with the first
requiring greater disclosure than the second [9]. In spite of
this, almost all participants chose the first store when it was
e1 cheaper, and proportions were equal when the prices were
identical. In addition to low valuations, individuals often act
promiscuously with their personal data.
The popularity of social networking websites such as Face-
book and Twitter have led many to share excessive amounts
of information online [21]. While location-based services are
convenient for navigation, one poll found almost one in five
participants “checked-in” at physical locations, enabling social
media observers to track their exact whereabouts [10]. In a
2016 survey, although two-thirds of respondents reported to
want greater privacy protection, only 16% used protective
plug-ins and less than one-in-ten encrypted their emails [22].
Although the general public might claim to value their privacy,
they are found to act in a paradoxical manner.
This disparity between what individuals claim about privacy
and how they actually act is known as the Privacy Paradox
[11]. Although the situation might appear illogical on initial
inspection, the existence of this phenomena has been suggested
through a number of studies. Barnes analysed the social
networking habits of US teenagers and concluded that “adults
are concerned about invasions of privacy, while teenagers
freely give up personal information”, attributing this disparity
to adolescents’ lack of awareness [23]. Acquisti and Gross
surveyed Facebook users in analysing the impact of privacy
concerns on observed behaviour [24]. Validating the paradox,
they found even those with significant concerns joined the
network and shared large amounts of data.
Norberg et al. questioned participants on their willingness to
disclose data before requesting the same information through
market researchers twelve weeks later [25]. They found that
regardless of the type of information, including PII and finan-
cial data, respondents disclosed a far greater quantity than they
initially claimed. Acquisti found that individuals act differently
to what had been traditionally considered rational, concluding
that users focus on the short-term gratification of a service
without considering the long-term risks [26]. The following
year, Acquisti and Grossklags surveyed a number of students
on their privacy attitudes, finding that while almost 90%
claimed to be concerned, their usage of protective technologies
was “consistently low”. [27]. These studies repeatedly indicate
a disparity between the claimed value of privacy and the
actions which individuals undertake to protect it. From this,
a number of factors have been suggested which contribute to
the paradox.
III. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS
The prevalence of the Privacy Paradox has been frequently
investigated, but of greater utility is understanding which
factors contribute to this phenomenon. By investigating what
leads to this disparity between claim and action, we can look to
better-protect individuals’ privacy. Through surveying existing
literature we identified five classes of factors which compound
the paradox: education and experience, usability and design,
privacy risk salience, social norms, and policies and con-
figurations. These categories are neither intended to be ex-
haustive nor mutually exclusive: some factors could be placed
in multiple classes while others were omitted due to their
immutability. For example, demographics are found to have
an influence, with women seen to be more privacy-conscious
than men [28]. However, that certain groups perceive privacy
differently is a product of largely immutable physiological
and sociological factors which cannot be easily altered. We
continue by discussing these classes of contributory factors
and considering issues in the context of the Internet-of-Things.
A. Education and Experience
Education has been shown to affect individuals’ perceptions
of privacy. O’Neil analysed an online survey and found that
those with doctoral degrees possessed the greatest level of
privacy concern, successively followed by vocational degrees,
professional degrees, college attendance and high school [29].
Williams and Nurse saw that those with the highest levels of
education revealed the fewest elements of optional data [30]. In
their study of demographic data disclosure they went on to find
that those educated in cybersecurity matters were even more
reluctant to reveal their information. Lewis and colleagues
discovered that those with more online experience are likely
3to have stronger privacy configurations [31], suggesting digital
literacy has an effect. This might be for a number of reasons,
including the importance of self-efficacy and that those most
acquainted with computing devices are likely to feel less in-
timidated by technology. While desktops and laptops might be
familiar to a large section of society, the proliferation of novel
IoT devices could pose a greater challenge as heterogeneous
products flood the market.
B. Usability and Design
Adams and Sasse explained how individuals do not try to
act insecurely, but poor usability is an impediment to correct
behaviour [32]. When users misjudge system functionality
they often place their privacy and security at risk, whether by
misconfiguring application settings or divulging information
accidentally [33]. Individuals might possess mature mental
models of how they expect a computing device to function;
when these assumptions are misplaced then issues can arise
[34]. Therefore, those well-trained in operating conventional
computers might misjudge the functionality of novel IoT
technologies such as smart appliances or wearable devices.
While individuals might develop mental models which
correctly align with user interfaces, understanding systems-
level interactions will be more challenging. Traditionally data
was collected by a single device and stored locally, or only
shared under the explicit consent of the user. However, our
world is becoming increasingly interconnected as informa-
tion is collated and aggregated in vast quantities. Individuals
might disclose data in one context without considering the
consequences of further propagation and dissemination. For
example, while students proudly share photos of themselves
across social media, they can later regret these decisions when
their images are viewed by potential employers. With IoT
nodes surreptitiously recording and sharing input from their
surroundings, ordinary users might have little knowledge of
how widely their data has spread.
Unfortunately, many online platforms are specifically de-
signed to maximise information disclosure. Ulbricht evaluated
Facebook design through the lens of institutional economics,
observing a conflict of interest as the portal wishes to collect
as much data as possible [35]. This appears also true for
IoT technologies, with user information providing an abundant
resource for monetisation. Jensen et al. found that interfaces
which display trust marks reduce privacy concern [36], and
social networking sites receive large amounts of personal in-
formation partly due to their attractive design. The novelty and
functionality of nascent IoT devices might similarly distract
consumers from the quantities of data they are disclosing.
C. Privacy Risk Salience
The salience of privacy risk is also an important factor
affecting user behaviour. Spiekermann et al. noted concerns
might differ between the online and offline world, with even
private individuals forgetting their reservations in digital en-
vironments [37]. While citizens might intuitively regard a
closed door as protecting one’s privacy, they have difficulty
interpreting equivalent actions in the online world [38]. Even
if individuals do become acquainted with the importance of
passwords and cyber security, privacy risks can be disguised
by the novelty and functionality of new devices. Numerous
studies have suggested the importance of salience, with Tsai
et al. finding that privacy indicators on search engines can
encourage individuals to alter their behaviour [39]. Adjerid et
al. found that even a delay of 15 seconds between a privacy
notice and a decision can result in less-private actions being
taken [40]. If the salience of privacy risk can be obscured by
familiar computing devices, ubiquitous IoT technologies will
only exacerbate this problem.
D. Social Norms
Social norms play an important role in defining what
individuals consider normal and acceptable. While consumers
of the 1980s stored personal data in their own homes, now
many think little of sharing their lives across social media
and the cloud. Broad changes in attitudes can lead to herding
effects, where individuals feel compelled to align with the
actions of their contemporaries [41]. This goes some way
to explain why privacy-protective messaging services such as
Signal fail to gain market share, as users are unwilling to invest
in niche products not used by their friends. Metcalfe’s Law
[42] states that the value of a network is proportional to the
square of its connected users, and therefore privacy apps face a
challenge in gaining initial support. Internet users move “like
a swarm of killer bees”, adapting their behaviours to match
that of those around them [43]. In such a context, even when
individuals wish to act privately, their behaviour gravitates
to what they consider “normal”. Social norms often differ
between cultures, and privacy perceptions have been shown
to vary across the world [44]. Daehnhardt et al. conducted
a study of Twitter settings, finding that citizens from Japan
were more private than those from Brazil or Spain [45]. This
was due to individuals from ‘Multi-Active’ societies being
considered more likely to project their opinions than those
from ‘Reactive’ cultures.
Norms also differ across age groups, with research suggest-
ing teenagers disregard their privacy [23]. However, children
have been shown to still value this principle in other contexts,
such within the family [46]. The elderly often encounter the
Privacy Paradox, possessing strong concerns despite facing nu-
merous technological obstacles [47,48]. Irrespective of culture
or age, as IoT devices integrate themselves into society, the
acceptability of ubiquitous data collection is likely to increase.
Utz and Kra¨mer found that social network settings were
adjusted as users undertook impression management, often
reducing protections to promote themselves more effectively
[49]. As Rose aptly stated, “society is changing, norms are
changing, confidentiality is being replaced by openness” [50],
and this trend looks to continue with the Internet-of-Things.
E. Policies and Configurations
While privacy policies should increase transparency and
reduce disparities between expectation and reality, the opposite
is often true. In the Jensen et al. study, they found that concern
was reduced by the mere presence of privacy policies, even
4if they were not read [36]. Policies are frequently written in
such an obfuscated fashion that even users who care about
their privacy might have little recognition of the data they
are disclosing [51]. Acceptance is gradually becoming more
implicit, moving from click-wrap licensing through checking
a box, to browse-wrap licensing by reading a webpage [52].
Individuals eager to use a service are likely to ignore privacy
statements, sacrificing sensitive information before they under-
stand their loss. In a similar fashion, those enthusiastic to use
novel IoT devices might bypass documentation and become
bound to conditions of which they have little awareness.
Default configurations might not respect privacy and rely
on the inertia of users to support data collection. While social
networks might provide extensive privacy settings for custom-
isation, Mackay found that individuals tend not to deviate from
default configurations [53]. Even when attempts at alteration
are made, controls are frequently too complex for ordinary
users to make meaningful progress [54]. Compounded, this
creates ecosystems where many users possess insufficient
privacy protection, even though opportunities are demonstrably
available [55]. If current user interfaces and configurations
are troublesome for the general public, this will only be
exacerbated through the proliferation of IoT devices.
IV. THE INTERNET-OF-THINGS
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has the potential to be a
truly revolutionary technology [15], connecting together vast
numbers of devices and blurring the boundaries between the
virtual and the physical. Miorandi and colleagues described it
as a “global network interconnecting smart objects”, “the set
of supporting technologies necessary” and the market oppor-
tunities leveraged from these developments [56]. In essence,
the IoT is the interconnection of large numbers of ubiquitous
devices which collect and process data. Although our current
Internet is vast, its scale will pale in comparison to these
exciting new networks [57].
The IoT has a long history of development through a
number of related fields, including computer networking, tele-
communications and wireless sensor networks [15]. However,
the IoT looks to differ from many conventional devices,
particularly servers, desktops and laptops. From a reflection on
the existing literature, we have identified five classes in which
new developments might depart from existing technologies:
usability and configuration, ubiquity and physicality, resource
constraints, unfamiliarity and heterogeneity, and market forces
and incentives. Again, these categories are neither intended to
be exhaustive nor mutually exclusive; for example, product
unfamiliarity and poor usability could both contribute to the
formation of inaccurate mental models. However, these classes
act as a useful scaffold to explore how the IoT might alter the
technological landscape and what impact this might have on
privacy.
A. Usability and Configuration
Due to small form factors and low unit prices, IoT user
interfaces might not be as rich or expressive as found on
modern desktop computers [58]. In 2013 the UK government
commissioned a usability study on a series of IoT heating
devices, finding that none of the five market leaders offered
sufficient user interfaces [59]. Issues included the “complex
setup of schedules” and “difficulty identifying system state”,
both of which could contribute to the inadvertent disclosure
of sensitive data. While existing technologies are familiar to a
large proportion of individuals, those using IoT devices might
not possess the accurate mental models [60] required for their
security and privacy.
Even those able to navigate novel interfaces might not
understand the summation of Internet-of-Things interactions.
Two decades ago data was stored on local hard-drives, whereas
current individuals are more prepared to save their information
remotely. However, as IoT nodes communicate autonomously
and forward aggregations to distant networks, ordinary users
might not be conscious of where their data is going. Cloud
services already cause concerns for corporations [61], who
might not know where their information is stored, and these
trends will only continue. While a device in isolation might
align with existing mental models, the composability of IoT
products poses a novel conceptual challenge.
Just as free social networks need to collect user information,
IoT technologies are primarily designed to facilitate interaction
and automation. Individuals seldom deviate from default set-
tings [53], and this inertia might increase in IoT environments.
While apathy already reduces the likelihood of amendment,
IoT reconfiguration might be constrained by limited interfaces
or require advanced technical knowledge [62].
B. Ubiquity and Physicality
Although the scale of the current Internet is vast, it will
appear minute in comparison to IoT infrastructure [57]. While
some devices might already possess online capabilities, such
as CCTV cameras, the number of such technologies will
increase on an exponential scale over the coming decades.
This produces several challenges, including uniqueness and
addressability, with billions of machines connected to the same
infrastructure. Fortunately, the development of IPv6 provides
a suitably large address space and makes Network Address
Translation (NAT) largely redundant.
The scale of data collection will also be unprecedented [63].
While modern mobile phones collect metrics through their
accelerometers and gyroscopes, pervasive IoT technologies
could document our lives as never before [64]. Although the
online and offline worlds are increasingly enmeshed, we can
usually isolate ourselves from the Internet by undertaking
our tasks in an analogue fashion. However, as sensors record
their surroundings and actuators alter their environments, the
distinction between the physical and the virtual becomes
increasingly unclear [65].
C. Resource Constraints
While modern machines appear virtually unrestricted in
their computing power, many IoT products operate with very
constrained resources. The origin of this issue is twofold:
firstly, IoT gadgets require a portable power source for re-
mote environments; and secondly, small form factors do not
5allow for large batteries [66]. To maximise their lifespan,
these devices constrain their processing power, limiting the
complexity of possible calculations [67]. These restrictions
dictate that resource-intensive communication protocols are
infeasible, posing a challenge for secure transmissions which
rely on cryptography [68]. If IoT devices communicate using
weak or immature protocols then data confidentiality is placed
at risk.
D. Unfamiliarity and Heterogeneity
Whereas individuals are accustomed to desktop and laptop
computers, only a small proportion so far are familiar with IoT
products [69]. With these new technologies offering significant
benefits to convenience and productivity, consumers might be
myopic to the potential risks of the platform. Although we
use numerous operating systems and hardware from many
vendors, the range of IoT devices is unprecedented, turn-
ing “heterogeneous networks” into “super-heterogeneous net-
works” [70]. The IoT is an incredibly nebulous term, including
but not limited to home automation (e.g. Nest, Hive), wearable
devices (e.g. Fitbit, Apple Watch) and industrial control. This
extreme heterogeneity proves problematic for standardisation,
leading to several piecemeal approaches which do not seam-
lessly interact [71]. Although the IPSO Alliance looks to unify
vendors from across technology and communications, further
work is required to enable widespread interoperability.
E. Market Forces and Incentives
Since products which are launched early establish strong
commercial positions, appearance and functionality is often
prioritised over other considerations. The implication for the
IoT is that the market will be flooded with attractive and
feature-rich devices, with privacy and security only considered
as an afterthought [72]. Internet-of-Things products are fre-
quently sold at low unit prices, and these will only decrease
further as competition expands. Efforts to reduce manufactur-
ing costs have implications for what might be viewed as the
non-essential functionality of the device. For example, a small
smartwatch might not have mechanisms to set a password
or PIN code. It is unlikely inexpensive products will possess
strong tamper-resistance, posing risks especially when nodes
are stationed in remote locations. Few of us currently own IoT
devices [69] and therefore their ubiquity and necessity does
not appear inevitable. However, herding effects suggest [41]
that once the IoT is firmly established individuals will begin
considering these technologies as “normal” and abstention
might be viewed as antiquated.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The Internet-of-Things will disrupt our established notions
of technology, both offering numerous opportunities and pro-
moting a series of risks. Developments of the next decade will
transform many factors which current socio-digital interactions
rely on. While the Privacy Paradox presently leads to challen-
ging disparities between claim and action, we posit that the
aforementioned contributory factors will be aggravated by the
IoT. This exacerbation will occur for three key reasons, The
Interfaces, The Data and The Market, as discussed below.
A. The Interfaces
Firstly, novel, heterogeneous and often-constrained user
interfaces might lead to further privacy risks. Usability is
critical for the correct operation of a device, with mistakes and
misconceptions contributing to costly errors. In an age where
few bother to peruse user manuals, technology must carefully
align with mental models to offer intuitive interaction. How-
ever, while the IoT market is rapidly expanding, few of the
general population have yet purchased these promising devices
[69]. Therefore, these technologies will remain unfamiliar for
some time and during this period existing mental models might
be misaligned, what Karl Smith terms “cognition clash” [73].
In this manner, even if individuals care about their privacy
they might have little idea of how to protect their data.
The heterogeneity of devices in the nebulous IoT will
also contribute to this issue, as users struggle to familiarise
themselves with a miscellany of differing interfaces. Cur-
rently consumers might select operating systems from several
vendors or hardware from a dozen manufacturers, but they
are soon familiar with these technologies. However, with
many IoT products possessing small or non-existent screens,
individuals might struggle to become acquainted. The best
efforts of privacy-conscious individuals might be in vain if
there is little understanding of how to correctly use a device.
The affordances and constraints of an interface subtly direct
a user to undertake certain actions and refrain from others
[74]. With both the core functionality and underlying business
models of IoT products relying on data collection, devices
might be designed to encourage disclosure. Default settings,
seldom adjusted [53], will likely enable the capture of data
which can be monetised by vendors and third parties. While
user apathy contributes to reconfiguration inertia, IoT privacy
settings might be too obfuscated to offer a feasible alternative.
Even if individuals wish to protect their data, they might
require specialist technical knowledge to reconfigure their
products, if this is even possible.
Risk is a salient thought in the physical world, with soci-
eties developing norms and customs to minimise the dangers
they face. Virtual threats are less tangible as individuals feel
insulated behind their computer screens [75]; a factor which
has contributed to the growth of cybercrime. Risk salience
has been found critically important in encouraging privacy-
conscious actions online [39], and this is likely true in novel
IoT environments. Citizens understand that locking a door pro-
tects their privacy and gradually accept that strong password
selection achieves a similar goal in the virtual space. However,
in environments as nebulous, novel and heterogeneous as the
IoT, ordinary individuals will have little chance understanding
the risks they face, irrespective of their privacy concerns.
B. The Data
Secondly, ubiquitous device presence and unprecedented
levels of data collection will expand the reach of technological
surveillance. This is partially due to the vast scale predicted for
the IoT, with billions of devices embedded into every aspect of
our society [57]. The US government have already confirmed
that IoT devices could be the target of surveillance efforts,
6presenting the strategic importance of these ubiquitous nodes
[76]. Although our current networking infrastructure is large
and widespread, it does not pervade our lives in the manner
suggested by the nascent Internet-of-Things.
Another contributory factor to this surveillance is the ubi-
quitous presence of devices, continuing the gradual shift from
the server room to the bedroom to the pocket. Although smart-
phones and tablets succeed through their extended mobility, it
is wearable devices that begin to blur the physical and virtual
worlds. When nodes monitor bodily functions and sensors
track their owners, privacy becomes antiquated regardless of
calls for protection.
Although data collection can be conducted covertly, we
usually have some degree of awareness. Whether through un-
noticed CCTV operation signs or voluminous privacy policies,
we generally have some means of detecting surveillance. How-
ever, when ubiquitous devices pervade our physical world we
cannot be certain when our actions are being monitored. Out-
cry was seen in response to Google Glass functionality, with
restaurants refusing patrons who might be covertly recording
each other [77]. Even discounting state surveillance, device
vendors could quickly infer one’s daily patterns, diet and
social interactions [78]. With inaccurate mental models and
constrained user interfaces obstructing device configuration,
consumers might be oblivious to when products are actually
active. Even those who profess to value their privacy can do
little when they are oblivious to pervasive monitoring.
Of considerable concern is the lack of consent required
by ubiquitous devices. Although clickwrap and browsewrap
licenses are ignored by most online visitors, they still present
opportunities for users to review the terms to which they are
bound. This assumes that the party navigating to a website is
the one whose data is collected, but this might not be true
in IoT environments. While those who purchase devices can
examine privacy policies, those without IoT products can be
monitored without their consent. In this manner, those most
fervently in opposition to surveillance might still have their
privacy violated by the actions of device owners.
C. The Market
Thirdly, market forces and misaligned incentives will con-
tribute to the proliferation of cheap devices with minimal
privacy protection. As these products become more lucrative,
competition will expand and prices will decrease. While smart
appliances might have larger price points, wearable gadgets
and sensor nodes will possess tighter profit margins. With
the market driven by novelty, appearance and functionality,
manufacturers will have little incentive to offer strong security
or privacy [72]. To the contrary, user data can be monetised
and sold to third parties, suggesting privacy is in tension
with the business models of many IoT vendors. With security
features requiring valuable time and money to implement,
manufacturers may rationally invest those resources in enhan-
cing functionality, especially when consumers are seen to use
services in spite of their privacy concerns [24]. These incent-
ives suggest a proliferation of insecure data-collecting devices,
with privacy-conscious individuals offered little alternative.
While international privacy standards could offer protec-
tion against the IoT, their guidelines are often unrealistic.
ISO/IEC29100 requests companies “try and understand the
expectations and preferences” of their users [79], a suggestion
in direct tension with the Privacy Paradox. User expectations,
intentions and actions often differ wildly, with this likely true
in unfamiliar IoT environments. The framework also considers
PII (Personally Identifiable Information) to not include an-
onymised data, despite the proven effectiveness of many de-
anonymisation techniques [80]. As with many international
standards, companies are not compelled to comply with these
guidelines. Therefore IoT vendors are likely to pursue their
own financial interests and collect extensive quantities of data.
Software updates are an expensive fixed cost for a vendor,
only supported by a profitable initial sale. Funding developers
to undertake maintenance requires a healthy profit margin,
which might not be feasible for smaller devices. At this
point, manufacturers have little incentive to patch software
vulnerabilities or improve the functionality of their shipped
products. Again, this leads to large numbers of insecure
devices which place the confidentiality of consumers’ data at
risk. With research suggesting that individuals trade privacy
for a e1 discount [8], secure alternatives might find difficulty
gaining support, and therefore leave the market.
At the systems-level, the market is driving the increased
composability of IoT devices. With intelligence moving from
the centre to individual nodes, information will be collected
and processed in unprecedented quantities. Whereas mundane
data points might pose little risk in isolation, the aggregation
of such metrics could reveal highly-sensitive details. Once
information has been disclosed and propagated through IoT
networks it might be impossible to amend or delete. Internet-
of-Things products should not be considered in a vacuum; it
is the multiplication of their individual functionalities which
could place privacy in jeopardy.
As previously mentioned, appearance and functionality ap-
pears to drive the IoT market rather than privacy or security
[72]. Although adoption is currently tentative, once products
reach a critical mass then herding effects and marketing will
stimulate greater proliferation. The prospect of storing our
personal information in an external data centre might have
seemed radical two decades ago, but this is how many of us
live our daily lives. Individuals share sensitive details with
the world on social networking sites, even though similar
actions in the 1980s would have perplexed contemporaries.
Social norms might evolve more slowly than technology,
but market pressures encourage the increased disclosure of
personal information. While we might currently label smart-
watches, smart-clothing or embedded health devices as unne-
cessary or invasive, these technologies could pervade society
in the next decade. The disparity between privacy claim and
action is great, partially fuelled by technological changes to
established social practices. The Privacy Paradox will only
grow as individuals clutch to traditional notions of privacy
while living in a vastly interconnected world.
The interconnections between Internet-of-Things novelties
and those factors contributory to the Privacy Paradox are
summarised below in Figure 1.
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D. Future Research
We have identified a number of ways in which IoT devel-
opments might exacerbate the Privacy Paradox. If we wish
to preserve privacy over the coming decades we must pursue
research of both a technical and socio-technical nature. As
technological investigations are often in tension with IoT
vendor interests, software restrictions and Terms of Use could
stifle several approaches. Several of the following studies
could be constrained by proprietary architectures or privacy
policies, and research should be considered on the basis of
its likely practicality. However, with many devices offering
rich APIs and the interactivity of products likely to increase,
opportunities are set to expand in the future. Naturally, cer-
tain individuals might be willing to trade their privacy for
convenience, with the principle being highly subjective and
contextual. Our suggested research aims to enable individuals
to make an informed choice rather than constrain their actions
in a paternalistic manner.
Technologically, there are several endeavours which might
help us better align privacy claims, intentions and actions.
The research community could explore the development of
enhanced user interfaces as a means of increasing risk salience.
Prior research suggests that highlighting the concept of risk
can encourage privacy-conscious behaviour [39], and we could
use a similar approach to alert IoT users when they face
important decisions. Such techniques should not inhibit device
functionality nor restrict individuals from performing actions,
but simply inform them of the privacy risks they face. If we
find that individuals using these enhanced interfaces disclose
less sensitive data, then this suggests that marketplace IoT
devices can be amended to better protect privacy.
In another approach to increase salience, risk exposure
could be calculated and displayed based on disclosed in-
formation. Data points could be correlated and aggregated
to infer unknown activities, using a similar approach to a
data-reachability model [81]. By highlighting the risk that
individuals face through their IoT interactions, users could
make informed choices on which features to enable. The
product owner could define which pieces of information they
wish to disclose, with the application traversing an inference
tree to highlight what details they are actually revealing.
Such an approach would look to reduce the disparity between
individuals’ perceptions of privacy risk and the consequences
of their actions.
Default settings currently contribute to the Privacy Paradox,
as discussed earlier. As a means of promoting privacy as a
standard, configurations could be programmatically adjusted
to reduce unnecessary data disclosure. While this might impair
some device functionality, certain features could be permitted
but considered opt-in rather than opt-out. With users seldom
deviating from default configurations [53], we could study
whether the risk exposure of ordinary individuals can be
reduced through these modifications.
We could explore the mocking of individual device readings
by interacting with underlying APIs. Device functionality
could be largely retained while faked values are provided
in lieu of real data, protecting the privacy of concerned
individuals. A similar technique was taken by the MockDroid
tool, which interfaced with Android applications to reduce
sensitive data leakage [82]. Although false metrics could
reduce the usefulness of parts of a device, the addition of noise
to individual readings could maintain an accurate average
while concealing the true data. If users can appreciate product
functionality while their personal information is masked, then
this has implications for the development of IoT Privacy-
Enhancing Technologies (PETs).
Of the most significant privacy concerns is that IoT devices
can record data without the explicit knowledge of their owner.
In an attempt to mitigate this risk, we could explore re-
stricting surveillance to certain time-periods or geographic
locations. This could be potentially achieved by modifying
APIs, programmatically toggling configurations or jamming
communications signals. User testing could complement this
approach to ascertain whether individuals can receive some
respite from incessant data collection. With few users expect-
ing surreptitious surveillance, these modifications could better
align privacy expectations with the reality.
Although technological approaches can support privacy,
socio-technical research is also required for a comprehensive
solution. Opaque privacy policies contribute to a disparity
between individual expectations and reality. We could explore
the development of concise and legible documents to accom-
pany IoT products, and investigate whether this reduces the
Privacy Paradox. If users understand how their personal data
will actually be used, then perhaps they will be more cautious
in disclosing their information. Individual privacy preferences
could be encoded and compared against IoT products to
highlight conflicts, in a similar manner to the P3P web tool
[83]. Web corporations have been previously compelled to
simplify their privacy policies [84] and such a mandate for
smart devices should be considered by regulators.
As a means of counteracting market pressures for data col-
lection, we could develop a metric for IoT privacy. This would
consider the quantity of information extracted, the covertness
of surveillance, the necessity of this data and how it is stored
by the vendor. Those manufacturers who collect data for purely
8functional purposes might be rated highly, while those who
sell aggregations to third parties would receive low scores.
Establishing a competitive advantage for privacy, these metrics
would recognise products which offer convenient functionality
without demanding excessive amounts of personal data. This
would be similar in principle to food health ratings, which
shame restaurants with poor standards and incentivise vendors
to improve their practices.
Finally, the importance of device familiarity could be further
explored by comparing the actions of novice and experienced
IoT users. A longitudinal study could track disclosure levels
over a period of time, investigating whether individuals alter
their behaviour as they become more accustomed to a product.
Device users might actually provide more personal informa-
tion as they discover additional functionality or risk salience
decreases. Such research would clarify our understanding of
familiarity, of particular importance as the market is flooded
with novel and heterogeneous products.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the Privacy Paradox: the
disparity between what individuals claim about privacy and
how they appear to act. We reviewed those factors which have
been found contributory to this phenomenon, including user
interface design, risk salience and social norms. We described
the nascent field of the Internet-of-Things and considered how
these novel technologies might differ from more-conventional
computing devices. We posited that these developments will
aggravate those same factors which contribute to the Privacy
Paradox, further compounding a challenging situation. We
claimed this exacerbation was for three key reasons: novel,
heterogeneous and constrained user interfaces; ubiquitous
device presence and vast data collection; and market forces
and misaligned incentives. Finally, to further investigate the
matter we suggested technological and socio-technical re-
search, including enhancing user interfaces, altering default
configurations and simplifying IoT privacy policies.
It is our hope that such work would promote a reasonable
balance between functionality and data protection, rather than
accepting surveillance for convenience. Just as individuals
share their information with greater freedom than two decades
ago, future societies might view pervasive data collection
as entirely normal. With market incentives encouraging ag-
gregation and ignoring both privacy and security, regulation
might be required to limit vendor violations. As the physical
world becomes increasingly intertwined with the virtual, the
tangibility of privacy risk could further decrease. While the
Privacy Paradox leads individuals to disclose despite their
concerns, when data collection is supported by billions of
insecure devices there might not be any alternative.
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